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This paper analyzes the signaling eﬀect of bidding in a two-round elimination contest. Before
the ﬁnal round, bids in the preliminary round are revealed and act as signals of the contestants’
private valuations. Depending on his valuation, a contestant may have an incentive to bluﬀ or
sandbag in the preliminary round in order to gain an advantage in the ﬁnal round. I analyze
this signaling eﬀect and characterize the equilibrium in this game. Compared to the benchmark
model, in which private valuations are revealed automatically before the ﬁnal round and thus
no signaling of bids takes place, I ﬁnd that strong contestants bluﬀ and weak contestants sand-
bag. In a separating equilibrium, bids in the preliminary round fully reveal the contestants’
private valuations. However, this signaling eﬀect makes the equilibrium bidding strategy in the
preliminary round steeper for high valuations and ﬂatter for low valuations compared to the
benchmark model.
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11 Introduction
Contests are frequently used to model R&D races, political elections, science contests, promotions,
rent-seeking and lobbying, etc. In a contest, players compete for prizes by submitting “bids” and,
regardless of results, all “bids” are sunk. Diﬀerent situations give diﬀerent interpretations of a
“bid”. For example, in R&D races, political elections, and rent-seeking and lobbying, it represents
the amount of money spent by each player, while in science contests and promotions, it becomes
the amount of eﬀort exerted by a contestant or a worker. Depending on how a winner is selected,
two major branches are distinguishable in the literature. Hurely and Shogren [12, 13], Nti [19],
Tullock [22] model contests as lotteries where a player’s winning probability is equal to the ratio
of his own bid to the total bids. Bay et. al [2], Hillman and Riley [9], on the other hand, model
contests as all-pay auctions where the winner is the one with the highest bid.
In many real life contests, players are initially divided into a few groups and they ﬁrst compete
within their own subgroups and then winners from each group compete again in later stages. As
pointed out in Moldovanu and Sela [18]: “Besides sports, elimination contests are very popular and
widely used in the following situations: (1) in the organization of internal labor markets in large
ﬁrms and public agencies, the sub-contests are usually regional or divisional, and the prizes are
promotions to well-deﬁned (and usually equally paid) positions on the next rung of the hierarchy-
ladder; (2) in political competition (e.g., for the US presidency), candidates ﬁrst spend resources
to secure their party’s nomination, and later, if they are nominated, spend more resources to get
elected; and (3) science contests among university or high-school students, e.g., the Mathematics
Olympiad.”
In real life elimination contests, contestants’ actions in each round are usually publicly observed
before the next round. For example, in the labor market promotions, workers usually know how
well their colleagues have done in the past; in many political campaigns, expenditures exerted by
candidates in securing votes are also publicly observed. Contestants anticipate that their actions
in the earlier round act as signals of their types (such as strength, ability, valuation and talent),
and that their signals inﬂuence their rivals’ beliefs and strategies in later rounds.1 Therefore,
contestants have incentives either to engage in “bluﬃng” by submitting a bid higher than their
true types would submit in equilibrium or to engage in “sandbagging” by submitting a bid lower
than their true types would submit in equilibrium in order to gain some advantages in the later
round. I investigate this signaling eﬀect by considering a two-round elimination contest under
incomplete information. I assume that the preliminary round is an all-pay auction and that the
ﬁnal round is a lottery.
Since I am interested in examining the signaling eﬀect, I focus on the equilibrium in which
the signaling occurs, i.e the separating equilibrium.2 In a separating equilibrium, players’ actions
(bids) in the preliminary round fully reveal their valuations, and there is complete information in
the ﬁnal round. Generally speaking, a bid in the preliminary round has two eﬀects. It changes
1Potentially, a contestant’s type is multi-dimensional. In this paper, I assume that a type is limit to the valuation
of the prize.
2Although the pooling equilibrium is of interest, most of the related literature focuses on the separating equilibrium
(see Goeree [3], Haile [6, 7, 8], and Mailath [15]).
2a player’s winning probability in the preliminary round, and it also has a signaling eﬀect. Since
I want to investigate how the signaling eﬀect aﬀects a player’s strategy, it is natural to look at
the benchmark model in which players’ valuations are revealed automatically and become common
knowledge before the ﬁnal round. This benchmark excludes the signaling eﬀect of a bid while
preserving its eﬀect on the winning probability.
Comparing this benchmark with my original model fully characterizes the signaling eﬀect. This
paper ﬁnds that weak contestants sandbag and strong contestants bluﬀ in the preliminary round
in the presence of the signaling eﬀect.3 In a separating equilibrium, a bid in the preliminary round
fully reveals a contestant’s private valuation. However, this signaling eﬀect imposes a downward
pressure on the equilibrium bidding strategy of weak contestants and an upward pressure on the
equilibrium bidding strategy for strong contestants in the preliminary round. In other words, this
signaling eﬀect makes the equilibrium bidding strategy in the preliminary round steeper for high
valuations and ﬂatter for low valuations compared to the benchmark. Intuitively, the signaling eﬀect
works as follows. Since a player’s expected valuation of entering the ﬁnal round is a decreasing
function of his rival’s bid in the ﬁnal round, there is an incentive for players to disguise their own
valuations in order to reduce their rivals’ bids in the ﬁnal round. Generally speaking, if a player
is strong, he anticipates that he will have a greater chance to meet a player weaker than himself
in the ﬁnal round. As a result, he bluﬀs in the preliminary round since he wants to discourage his
rival in the ﬁnal round. If he is a weak player, he anticipates that he will have a greater chance to
meet a player stronger than himself in the ﬁnal round. As a result, he sandbags in the preliminary
round since he would want his rival to underestimate him in the ﬁnal round.
In this paper, a separating equilibrium may fail to exist due to weak players’ sandbagging in the
preliminary round. This happens when the signaling eﬀect becomes strong enough to dominate the
eﬀect that pretending to be weaker decreases the winning probability. In this case, it is always better
for a player to under-represent his valuation in the preliminary round, since the gain increases while
the bidding cost decreases. I am able to identify a suﬃcient condition to guarantee the existence
of a separating equilibrium.
A salient feature of this model is that the outcome in the preliminary round (all-pay auction)
is more sensitive to the bids than that in the ﬁnal round (lottery). The reason is the tractability.
First, if I model both rounds as lotteries, then at the beginning of the preliminary round, all players
face symmetric incomplete information. However, there is no tractable solution for lottery under
incomplete information in general.4 Second, if I model both rounds as all-pay auctions, then, as
shown in Zhang [23], there exists no separating equilibrium.5 Third, it is well known in the contest





, where bi is player
i0s bid and λ is known as the sensitivity of the administrators, then an all-pay auction is equivalent
to a lottery when λ goes to inﬁnity. Therefore, I am actually modelling the two rounds with lotteries
but with diﬀerent sensitivity of the administrators.
3Horner and Sahuguet [11] state “bluﬃng (respectively sandbagging) occurs when a weak (respectively strong)
player seeks to deceive his opponent into thinking that he is strong (respectively weak).”
4Several papers in the literature, Hurely and Shogren [12, 13], and Malueg and Yates [16], have been written under
special settings, such as discrete private information or one-sided asymmetric information.
5The paper is available at http://www.econ.queensu.ca/students/phds/zhangjun/
3Although the main reason for this heterogeneity is the tractability, it is not vacuous in real life
elimination contests. In the USA, success in the primaries is more sensitive to eﬀort than success in
the presidential election since the latter is prone to more noise. In NHL or NBA tournaments, the
regular season have many more games and therefore the teams entering the playoﬀs are usually the
better teams. In contrast, the playoﬀs have less games and the result is more randomness. Many
famous TV shows also ﬁt my model.6 For example, in “American Idol”, the contestants compete in
their own divisions for tickets to Hollywood and the winners compete again in the ﬁnal round.7 In
the preliminary rounds, it is only the judges’ votes that count. Given that the judges are experts,
it is very likely that the result in this round will be very sensitive to eﬀort and, as a result, it is the
singers with more talent who win, similar to an all-pay auction. When winners get to Hollywood,
the votes of the judges no longer count and only the votes of viewers count. Since viewers are not
experts, it is possible that success may not be sensitive to eﬀort in this stage and the ﬁnal round
becomes a lottery.8
2 Related Literature
Early work on eliminating contests considers the case of complete information (See Groh et al [4],
Horen and Riezman [10], Hwang [14], Rosen [20], and Schwenk [21]). However, incomplete infor-
mation is conventionally an interesting topic in economic theory. Moldovanu and Sela [18] consider
a two-round elimination contest under incomplete information, but assume that the ﬁnalists only
know that their rivals are the winners from other groups. Therefore, there is no information trans-
mission regarding players’ actions in the ﬁrst round. If all the prizes are awarded to the winner in
the ﬁnal round, the model is equivalent to a static contest with several prizes in terms of revenue
and eﬃciency. They point out in their paper that “an interesting avenue is to focus on the role of
information in contests with multiple rounds”, which is the motivation for this paper.
To my knowledge, this is the ﬁrst paper to talk about the strategic impact of signalling in
contests. Lai and Matros (2006) have already considered a two-round elimination contest with
full revelation or no revelation of bidders’ bids and characterized the corresponding equilibria. In
their paper, both rounds are all-pay auctions. Their model is more general than ours, allowing for
more players dividing into more groups in the ﬁrst round. Furthermore, there are interim prizes
for the ﬁrst round winners. However, their approach is diﬀerent from ours. They assume that the
ﬁrst-round winners are committed to act according to their pretended type in the second round in
a deviation. Furthermore, a deviator’s valuation also becomes that of the pretended type. That
is, when a player deviates by pretending to be a diﬀerent type, he becomes that pretending type
in the second round. Wang and Zhang [23] assume that when a player deviates, he remains being
his original type. They prove that if players act optimally in both stages, no symmetric separating
equilibrium exists. In contrast, under the setup of this paper, in which the preliminary round is
6I am grateful for James Amegashie for alerting me of this example
7MY model is a simple version of the ”American Idol”. In my model, there is only one winner in the preliminary
round; in contrast, in the “American Idol”, there are multiple tickets to go to the Hollywood in the preliminary round
8Indeed, in the recent season of “American Idol”, there was a contestant with bad performance, Sanjaya, who the
judges did not like must kept advancing in the ﬁnal round because the viewers liked him.
4an all-pay auction and the ﬁnal round is a lottery, I am able to identify a separating symmetric
Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium.
MY paper is also related to Amegashie [1]. He analyzes the signaling eﬀect in dynamic contests
with one-sided incomplete information and ﬁnds that informed players exert higher eﬀort in the
preliminary round when the opponent in the ﬁnal round is weaker than they are and vice versa. In
his model, both of the rounds are lotteries. Players are fooled in equilibrium because of bounded
rationality. MY paper investigates a two-sided incomplete information model with fully rational
players.
Finally, my paper is also related to the literature on signaling in auctions, in which all players
have the chance to signal and bids are made simultaneously. Goeree [3] considers an auction followed
by an aftermarket, in which bidders compete for an advantage in future strategic interactions.9
Haile [6, 7, 8] considers an auction followed by a resale auction organized by the ﬁrst-round winner.
Bidders have noisy private signals and their information further improves in the resale round. In
all of those papers, the authors focus on the separating Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium, which
is also the equilibrium concept employed in my paper. However, a separating equilibrium may not
exist under certain situations.10 It is worthwhile to mention that Mailath [15] gives a suﬃcient
condition to ensure the existence of a separating equilibrium in simultaneous signaling two-period
games. Unfortunately, his result can not be applied to my model directly since he assumes that
the payoﬀs are additively separable, a condition which does not apply in my model. However, the
above paper still provides us with helpful insight in the analysis.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 analyzes the models with and without
the signaling eﬀect. Section 3 provides a comparison of the two models. Section 4 concludes.
3 The model
I consider a two-round elimination contest described as follows. There are 2N risk neutral players
in the contest. All players are divided into two groups. Player 1 to N are in group A while player
N + 1 to 2N are in group B. Players ﬁrst compete within their group in the preliminary round
simultaneously. The winner of group A is denoted as player A, and the winner of group B is denoted
as player B. The winners from the preliminary round (players A and B) enter the ﬁnal round and
compete for the prize.
Players have private information regarding their own valuation of the prize. Assume player
i’s valuation is Vi, with realization denoted by vi. Although players do not know other players’
valuations, they believe that they are drawn independently from a commonly known distribution
F(·), with associated density function f(·) and support V = [v,v]. I assume that both the valuation
and the density of valuation are bounded and away from 0, i.e. 0 < v < v < +∞ and 0 < f(v) <
9Also, in the introduction, he provides a good review of the literature on the signaling in auctions.
10Goeree [3] states “if bidders want to understate their private information, a separating equilibrium may fail to
exist when the incentives to signal via a lower bid are stronger for higher valuations”. Meanwhile, Haile [8] also ﬁnds
that, due to the signaling eﬀect, player’s objective function is not quasiconcave, and a separating equilibrium may
fail to exist.
5+∞ for v ∈ [v,v].
Player i competes with his rivals by making a bid bi and all bids are submitted simultaneously.
Regardless of success, all players pay for their bids. Therefore, a player’s payoﬀ is equal to his val-
uation multiplied by the winning probability less his bid. In the preliminary round the competition
technology is an all pay auction: the player with the highest eﬀort wins. In contrast, in the ﬁnal
round the competition technology is a lottery: a player’s winning probability is equal to the ratio
of his own bid to the total bid.
3.1 The benchmark
I assume that regardless of the outcome in the preliminary round, players’ valuations become
common knowledge after the preliminary round and before the ﬁnal round. Though it is not clear
how this mechanism is to be implemented, similar mechanisms have been used to analyze signaling
in auctions with an aftermarket [3], auctions with resale [5], and collusion in auctions [17]. Here, the
benchmark model is presented without worrying about the signaling eﬀect, which will be analyzed
later on.
I ﬁrst describe the timing of the game:
1. 2N players are equally divided into 2 groups: group A and group B.
2. Players privately learn their valuations.
3. A preliminary round contest is held in each group, using an all-pay auction.
4. After the preliminary round and before the ﬁnal round, players’ valuations become common
knowledge.
5. The winners from the preliminary round, players A and B, compete in the ﬁnal round, which
is held using a lottery.
To solve the model, I employ the concept of Perfect Beyesian Nash Equilibrium (PBNE). A
PBNE is a pair of strategies for each player and a posterior belief distribution, where the strategy
proﬁle is sequentially rational given the belief system and the belief is derived from the strategy
proﬁle through Bayes’ rule whenever possible. Since all payers are ex-ante identical before learning
their valuations, I look for the symmetric preliminary round bidding strategy. Within the equilib-
ria, I focus on the separating equilibrium that, in the preliminary round, players bid according to
a strictly increasing function. I ﬁrst look at the ﬁnal round.
Final round strategies
The winners from the preliminary round, players A and B, enter the ﬁnal round. Since all players’
valuations are revealed before the ﬁnal round, players’ beliefs about one another’s valuations are
not aﬀected by preliminary round actions. As a result, the ﬁnal round is a complete information
game, where players simultaneously choose their bids. Throughout this paper, superscripts denote
6the round, P or F, and the subscripts denote the player. The winning probability is given by a
simple form:
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It is useful to note that a player’s payoﬀ is a decreasing function of his rival’s bid. The following
lemma gives the equilibrium.
Lemma 1 In the complete information contest played by two players with valuations vi and vj,
in which players choose bids simultaneously and the winning probability is equal to the ratio of a





(vi + vj)2 ∀i,j ∈ {A,B},i 6= j





(vi + vj)2 ∀i,j ∈ {A,B},i 6= j
I refer to Nti [19] for the details of the proof.
From Lemma 1, I know that a player’s bid is an increasing function of his rival’s valuation when
the rival’s valuation is lower than his valuation, and a decreasing function of his rival’s valuation
when the rival’s valuation is higher than his valuation.11 This lemma is important for understand-
ing players’ strategies when they have the opportunity to signal.
Preliminary round strategies
Having solved the strategy in the ﬁnal round, I move on to the preliminary round. I assume that
all players adopt the same strictly increasing bidding strategy bP(·). In equilibrium, a player with
the lower bound valuation bids zero since he has a zero probability of winning. A player will not
bid more than bP(v) since bidding bP(v) gives him the same winning probability while saving the
cost. Therefore, choosing a bid to maximize one’s payoﬀ is equivalent to report one’s type opti-
mally. Since players are ex-ante identical, I choose player 1 as a representative. Given that all
other players adopt bP(·), player 1’s problem at the beginning of the preliminary round is given as
follows:
ΠP
1 (v1) = max
w E{ΠF
1 (v1,VB)I{w>Vi,∀ i=2,···,N}|v1} − bP(w)







(vi+vj)3 . When vj < vi,
∂bF
i (vA,vB)




7random variables, i.e the upper case letters.
The ﬁrst term is the expected gain from bidding and the second term is the cost of bidding. If
player 1 loses in the preliminary round, he gains nothing; if he wins the preliminary round, he gains





from Lemma 1. Meanwhile, player 1 knows that player B is the winner of group B. Since the
preliminary round is an all-pay auction, the winner must be the one with the highest valuation in
group B. For instance, player 1, if he can enter the ﬁnal round, believes that player B’s valuation
is the ﬁrst order statistic among all the players in group B, i.e. with cdf F(vB)N. Hence, player
1’s problem turns out to be:
ΠP
















(v1 + vB)2dF(vB)N − bP(w)
I can interpret this function as follows. The term F(w)N−1 is the winning probability in the





(v1+vB)2dF(vB)N is the expected valuation of entering the ﬁnal
round, and the term bP(w) is his bid. Note that the payoﬀ from losing is zero in the model setup.
The following proposition gives the equilibrium bidding strategy in the preliminary round and a
summary of the equilibrium of the whole game.
Proposition 1 In the elimination contest excluding the signaling eﬀect, in which players’ valua-
tions are automatically revealed after the preliminary round and before the ﬁnal round, the separating
symmetric PBNE is as follows.









In the ﬁnal round, the winners from the preliminary round, players A and B, knowing each other’s
valuation, bid as described by Lemma 1.
Proof: see the appendix
The expected valuation of entering the ﬁnal round just depends on a player’s own valuation and
the distribution of valuation. A high valuation player evaluates the ﬁnal round higher than a low
valuation player does. So if I redeﬁne the valuation as the expected valuation of entering the ﬁnal
round, then the preliminary round is the same as a normal form all-pay auction. The equilibrium
exists under any distribution of valuation. It is easy to check that the bidding function is indeed
strictly increasing, which is consistent with my presumption.
8Under this setting, preliminary round bids only aﬀect the winning probability in the preliminary
round. In contrast, as I can see below, in the game with signaling, action in the preliminary round
has an extra eﬀect. There is an inferential impact via the other players’ ﬁnal round strategies, since
they infer the player’s valuation from his action.
3.2 Incorporating signaling eﬀects
I need to replace time 4 in the previous model which excludes the signaling eﬀect:
4. After the preliminary round and before the ﬁnal round begins, all bids in the preliminary
round are observed by all the players and become common knowledge.
Types are not revealed automatically; instead, players’ bids in the preliminary round are re-
vealed. If I assume the equilibrium is separating and all players bid according to a strictly increasing
function in the preliminary round, say bP(·), then after the bids are revealed players can infer other
players’ valuations by inverting the bidding function. The ﬁnal round is a complete information
game and coincides with the ﬁnal round in the model without signaling eﬀects. However, since the
ﬁnalists are informed of the bids in the preliminary round, and valuations remain unobservable to
them, it is conceivable that a player may want to disguise himself by over-representing or under-
representing his valuation in the preliminary round in order to gain some advantages in the ﬁnal
round. To solve the model, I employ the concept of PBNE and work backwards.
Final round strategies
Suppose that in the preliminary round all players adopt the same strictly increasing bidding func-
tion, bP(·). I denote the image of the preliminary round strategy as bP(V) = [bP(v),bP(v)]. It
is not hard to see that the lower bound of bP(V) is bP(v) = 0, since the player with the lowest
valuation has zero probability of entering the ﬁnal round and thus would not bid more than zero.
If a player bids b ∈ bP(V) in the preliminary round, then according to Bayes’ rule, other players in
the ﬁnal round believe that his valuation is (bP)−1(b). If a player’s bid is outside the image of the
preliminary round bidding function, i.e. b > bP(v),12 I assume that all other players believe that he
has valuation v. As a result, bidding bP(v) strictly dominates bidding b > bP(v), since there is no
beneﬁt for the higher bid while the cost is higher. Under this speciﬁcation of the oﬀ-path beliefs,
no player has any incentive to deviate to a valuation outside the support of the valuation space
V. Therefore, I will focus on deviations of bids within the image of the preliminary round bidding
function.
In the non-deviated continuation game, where all players follow the equilibrium strategy, the
ﬁnal round becomes a lottery with complete information and coincides with the model without the
signaling eﬀect. In order to characterize the equilibrium bidding strategies in the preliminary round,
I need to examine one more deviated continuation game in the ﬁnal round. In this continuation
game, only one player deviates and does not following his equilibrium bidding function in the
preliminary round, but is able to enter the ﬁnal round.
12Since players can not bid a negative amount, the only possible bid, which is outside the image of the preliminary
round bidding function, is b > b
P(v).
9Since all players are ex-ante symmetric, I choose player 1 as the representative player and assume
that he is the one who deviates. Let w = (bP)−1(b) ∈ V be the valuation other players believe
player 1 has, which may or may not be player 1’s true valuation. If he loses in the preliminary
round, then it does not aﬀect the ﬁnal round contest. The following analysis applies when he wins
and enters the ﬁnal round, and thus becomes player A.
In the ﬁnal round, player B, the winner from group B, infers that player A’s valuation is w.
Player A learns that player B’s valuation is vB from his preliminary round bid. Furthermore, player
A knows that player B believes that he has valuation w. Of course, player A knows that his own
valuation is actually vA. The following lemma describes the equilibrium in this special deviated
continuation game.
















































When player A bluﬀs in the preliminary round and meets a very strong rival in the ﬁnal round,
I may have a corner solution; it is optimal for him to drop out in the competition and bid zero.
Otherwise, his bid in the ﬁnal round is an interior solution.
Preliminary Round Strategies
I now consider the preliminary round bidding function. Lemma 2 gives players’ strategies in the
special deviated continuation game when player 1 deviates and enters the ﬁnal round. Obviously,
player 1’s expected surplus from entering the ﬁnal round depends on both his true valuation and his
pretended valuation. Suppose that in the preliminary round all other players adopt the equilibrium
bidding function bP(·) and player 1 has valuation v1 but pretends to have valuation w. Then player
1’ payoﬀ in the whole game is given by:
E{ΠF
1 (w,v1,VB)I{w>Vi,∀ i=2,···,N}|v1} − bP(w)
10= E{I{w>Vi,∀ i=2,···,N}}E{ΠF
1 (w,v1,VB)|v1} − bP(w)
The ﬁrst term E{I{w>Vi,∀ i=2,···,N}} is the winning probability in the preliminary round, the second
term E{ΠF
1 (w,v1,VB)|v1} is the expected valuation of entering the ﬁnal round, and the last term
is the bid.















































A weak player anticipates that if he can enter the ﬁnal round he has a greater chance to meet
a player stronger than him. In that case, he would like to sandbag in the preliminary round and
induce his rival in the ﬁnal round to underestimate him and to bid less. If this signaling eﬀect
dominates the eﬀect of “sandbagging” decreasing the winning probability, then it is always better
to sandbagin the preliminary round and truthful reporting would not be the optimal choice. As
a result, a separating equilibrium may not exist. I need some restrictions on the distribution of
valuation to exclude this situation.







w+vB )2dF(vB)N. I assume that:
(i) G1(v1,v1) > 0, ∀v1 ∈ (v,v]
(ii) G12(w,v1) > 0, ∀w,v1 ∈ (v,v]
As in many dynamic models with asymmetric information, necessary and suﬃcient conditions
that ensure existence are diﬃcult to identify. Here, I give only one suﬃcient condition. Restriction
(i) ensures that bP(·) is strictly increasing, and restriction (ii) is the single-crossing condition.13
The restrictions (i) and (ii) given in the above assumption seem to be complicated and people
may doubt the existence of such a distribution of valuation that can satisfy both restrictions. The
following lemma is a suﬃcient condition to ensure that the distribution of valuation satisﬁes the
13A more straightforward formulation of the single crossing condition is as follows. Deﬁne U(v1,w,b
P) = G(w,v1)−
b
P, where v1 is player’s true valuation and w is his perceived valuation when he bids b
P. Single crossing condition




G1(w,v1) is increasing in v1, i.e. the ratio of the marginal cost of signaling
to the marginal beneﬁt of signaling is lower for higher valuations.
11restrictions above. It is straightforward since it just depends on the minimum valuation v, the
ratio of the maximum valuation to the minimum valuation R = v
v, and the minimum of the density
function M = minv f(v).
Lemma 3 The restrictions (i) and (ii) in Assumption 1 are satisﬁed if the distribution of valuation
satisﬁes the following conditions:
• 1 < R <
3 √
4








These conditions are most likely to be valid in the political campaign. The value of winning
the campaign is usually quite large for any party, and their valuations would not diﬀer too much.
The following proposition gives the equilibrium bidding strategy in the preliminary round and
a summary of the equilibrium of the whole game, under Assumption 1.
Proposition 2 Suppose Assumption 1 holds, then in the elimination contest with signaling eﬀect,
in which all players’ bids are revealed after the preliminary round and before the ﬁnal round, the
separating symmetric PBNE is as follows.
















In the ﬁnal round, the winners from the preliminary round, players A and B, knowing each other’s
valuation by inverting the bidding function, bid as described in Lemma 1.
Proof: See appendix
As I can see, the signaling eﬀect aﬀects the bidding strategy in the preliminary round. Since the
equilibrium is a separating one, players can correctly infer their rival’s valuation from his bid in the
preliminary round in the equilibrium. Therefore, the ﬁnal round turns into a complete information
game and the strategy coincides with that in the model excluding the signaling eﬀect.
4 Comparison
As I can see, the strategies in the ﬁnal round are exactly the same under two diﬀerent settings.
Though the preliminary round strategies are diﬀerent due to the signaling eﬀect, I can see the
12relationship between the two. Recall that:
bP
nosignaling




(v + ζ)2dF(ζ)N (1)
bP
signaling










I call bP 0(v) the marginal willingness to bid. As I can see, the two equations share the same




(v+ζ)2dF(ζ)N, which I call the winning probability eﬀect; while (2)
has an extra item: S(v) = F(v)N−1 R v
v
vζ(v−ζ)
(v+ζ)3 dF(ζ)N, which I call the signaling eﬀect. In the
model excluding the signaling eﬀect, actions in the preliminary round change the result through
the winning probability, which is an increasing function of the bid. In contrast, in the model with
the signaling eﬀect, actions in the preliminary round have one additional eﬀect: signaling eﬀect,
which is fully characterized by S(v).
How the signaling eﬀect aﬀects a player’s payoﬀ depends on his valuation. If S(v) is positive,
then it means that pretending to be stronger is good for the player overall. In contrast, if S(v) is
negative, it means that pretending to be weaker is good for the player overall. The speciﬁcation of
the function S(v) leads to the following crucial result.
Proposition 3 If R < 2, then there exists a threshold v∗, v < v∗ < v, such that for a player
with valuation v < v < v∗, his marginal willingness to bid is lower in the presence of the signaling
eﬀect(for valuation v = v, the marginal willingness to bid is the same); meanwhile, for a player
with valuation v∗ < v ≤ v, his marginal willingness to bid is higher in the presence of the signaling
eﬀect.
Proof: See appendix
See Figure 1 for an illustration.
Although Proposition 3 is for the case R < 2, I conjecture that the result holds for any distribu-
tion of valuation. Given that the distribution of valuation satisﬁes the restrictions in Assumption
1, the result holds.
This result is intuitive. Since a player’s payoﬀ in the ﬁnal round is a decreasing function of
his rival’s bid, he has the incentive to disguise himself to induce the rival to bid less in the ﬁnal
round. Under-representing his valuation in the preliminary round makes the rival in the ﬁnal round
underestimate him. This has two eﬀects. On the one hand, it makes the rival stronger than him
bid less, which increases his payoﬀ in the ﬁnal round. On the other hand, it makes the rival weaker
than him bid more, which decreases his payoﬀ in the ﬁnal round. Conversely, over-representing
his valuation in the preliminary makes the rival in the ﬁnal round overestimate him. This has two
eﬀects as well. It makes the rival stronger than him bid more, which decreases his payoﬀ in the ﬁnal
round. But it also makes the rival weaker than him bid less, which decreases his payoﬀ in the ﬁnal
round. In other words, if the player is strong, he anticipates that he will have a greater chance to
13Figure 1: Bidding function with and without the signaling eﬀect
meet a player weaker than himself in the ﬁnal round, and as a result, he is willing to over-represent
his valuation in the preliminary round since he wants to discourage the rival; if he is a weak player,
he anticipates that he will have a greater chance to meet a player stronger than himself in the ﬁnal
round, and as a result, he is willing to under-represent his valuation in the preliminary round since
he wants them to underestimate him.
For a strong player who has the incentive to over-report his valuation, he may end up with a
lower bid compared to the no signaling case, since weak players lower their bids too much.
In the equilibrium under both settings, the winners in the preliminary are the ones with the
highest valuations in their own groups, while the ﬁnal rounds coincide. Furthermore, the expected
payoﬀ of a player with lower bound valuation is always zero. If I deﬁne the organizer’s revenue
as the total expected bids, the well-known revenue equivalence theorem would suggest that both
models should generate the same revenue. In fact, revenue equivalence does not hold in my model.
This is simply because the model without the signaling eﬀect is not a feasible mechanism.
145 Conclusion
This paper examines how the signaling eﬀect works in a two-round elimination contest. Players are
assumed to ex-ante identical and are randomly divided into two groups. In the preliminary round,
players compete within their groups and the winners enter the ﬁnal round. In the benchmark model,
players’ valuations are automatically revealed in the ﬁnal round. Thus, the expected valuation of
entering the ﬁnal round just depends on a player’s own valuation and the distribution of valuation.
In contrast, in the second model, players’ valuations are not revealed in the ﬁnal round while all
players’ bids in the preliminary round are revealed. Given that in the preliminary round players
bid according to a strictly increasing function (separating equilibrium), actions in the preliminary
round fully reveal players’ valuations and thus aﬀect players’ actions in the ﬁnal round. Since
valuations are not known, players have the incentive to disguise themselves. As shown in this
paper, weak players are willing to pretend to be weaker and strong players are willing to pretend
to be stronger in the presence of the signaling eﬀect, which imposes a downward pressure on the
equilibrium bidding strategy for weak players and an upward pressure for the strong players.
156 Appendix
The following theorem will be used several times in the proof. A more general version of the lemma
can be found in Guesnerie and Laﬀont (1984). However, special cases were used in several papers,
such as McAfee et al (1993) and Myerson (1981).
Theorem 1 Consider a general all-pay auction
max
v U(v,v1) = max
v G(v,v1) − b(v) (3)
with boundary condition b(v) = 0. The expected gain function G(v,v1): [v,v] × [v,v] → R is twice
continuously diﬀerentiable and depends on both the true valuation v1 and the reported valuation v.
Assume that
• G1(v1,v1) > 0∀v1 ∈ (v,v],
• G12(v,v1) > 0∀v,v1 ∈ (v,v].
Then b(v1) =
R v1
v G1(ξ,ξ)dξ is the equilibrium bidding function. This bidding function is strictly
increasing and fully valuation revealing.
Proof:
Suppose there exists a strictly increasing function b(v) such that truthfully reporting (v = v1) is
optimal, then incentive compatibility implies that




Note that b0(v1) = G1(v1,v1) > 0,∀v1 ∈ (v,v]. So it is true that b(v1) is strictly increasing.
Given b(v1) =
R v1
v G1(ξ,ξ)dξ, I have
dU(v,v1)
dv
= G1(v,v1) − b0(v) = G1(v,v1) − G1(v,v) (5)
Since G12(v,v1) > 0 ∀v,v1 ∈ (v,v], then G1(v,v1) is a strictly increasing function of v1. Hence,
dU(v,v1)
dv = G1(v,v1) − G1(v,v) > 0 if v1 > v; and
dU(v,v1)
dv = G1(v,v1) − G1(v,v) < 0 if v1 < v.
Thus, v = v1 is optimal.
Q.E.D
Proof of Lemma 2
In the ﬁnal round, player B infers that player A’s valuation is w, and chooses his bid in the ﬁnal




(w+vB)2. Knowing player B’s valuation and his response func-
tion bF
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(w+vB)2 if w ≤ vA
0 otherwise
Plugging bF
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w+vB )2 if w ≤ vA
0 otherwise
Q.E.D
Proof of Lemma 3
Throughout the proof, recall that I have:
• 1 < R <
3 √
4















G1(v1,v1) > 0,∀v1 ∈ (v,v]









(v1+vB)3 dF(vB)N > 0,∀v1 ∈ (v,v]










(v1+vB)3 dF(vB)N > 0,∀v1 ∈ (v,v]
(6)
17G12(w,v1) > 0,∀w,v1 ∈ (v,v]
⇒ (N − 1)F(w)N−2f(w)
R v










wv1(w+vB)2dF(vB)N > 0,∀w,v1 ∈ (v,v]
⇒ (N − 1)f(w)
R v











wv1(w+vB)2dF(vB)N > 0,∀w,v1 ∈ (v,v]
(7)
The idea is very simple. If I can prove that the items inside the integration are always greater than
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Thus, restriction (6) is satisﬁed.













v) + 1 ∗
v(v−v)
2√vv(v+v)2


























Thus, restriction (7) is satisﬁed.
Q.E.D
Proof for Proposition 2












)2dF(vB)N − bP(w) (8)






















Now, I move on to prove that under the restrictions above, the bidding strategy (9) consists of
an equilibrium in the original model.






v1 goes to inﬁnity. Thus, if player 1 under-represents or over-represents locally, his problem
at the beginning of the preliminary round is exactly the same as problem (8) above, so the necessary
condition is already veriﬁed.
Suﬃcient condition: under the restrictions above, it is optimal to truthfully represent the
valuation in problem (8). Thus, I have:







v1+vB )2dF(vB)N − bP(v1)







w+vB )2dF(vB)N − bP(w), ∀w ∈ [v,v],w 6= v1
(10)
If player 1 under-represents his valuation, from (10), then the payoﬀ is lower.
If player 1 over-represents his valuation, then







v1+vB )2dF(vB)N − bP(v1)







w+vB )2dF(vB)N − bP(w)










w+vB )2dF(vB)N − bP(w) ∀w > v1
(11)
Thus, from (11), it also decreases the payoﬀ.
Hence, it is optimal to represent w = v1.
Q.E.D





(v+ζ)3dF(ζ)N, then S(v) = F(v)N−1vT(v).
















The last step follows the condition that R < 2.
Thus, T(v) is an strictly increasing function as well as T(v) < 0 and T(v) > 0. So there exists a
19threshold v < v∗ < v, such that for v ≤ v < v∗, T(v) < 0; and for v ≥ v > v∗, T(v) > 0.
For v = v, S(v) = 0, so the marginal willingness to bid is the same.
For v < v < v∗, S(v) = F(v)N−1vT(v) < 0, the marginal willingness to bid is lower in the presence
of the signaling eﬀect.
For v∗ < v ≤ v, S(v) = F(v)N−1vT(v) > 0, the marginal willingness to bid is higher in the presence
of the signaling eﬀect.
Q.E.D
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